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Standards of Willfulness Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
The statutes of limitations facing plaintiffs who bring actions 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act1 [FLSA] vary, depending upon 
the willfulness of the violation. The Act establishes two limitations: 
three years for willful violations, and two years for nonwillful viola-
tions. 2 It does not, however, define willfulness, and federal courts 
have interpreted the concept in two very different ways. Under the 
more prevalent rule, the test is: "Did the employer know the FLSA 
was in the picture?"3 But other courts have been more guarded, re-
serving the longer limitations period for "violations which are inten-
tional, knowing or voluntary as distinguished from accidental."4 
These two interpretations have markedly different ramifications. 
Under the broad approach, an employer's knowledge that the FLSA 
may apply makes any violation willful; good faith does not negate 
willfulness, and thus most FLSA violations remain actionable 
throughout a three-year limitations period. The narrow interpreta-
tion, in contrast, requires some evil intent by the employer, so that a 
demonstration of good faith is enough to trigger the briefer limita-
tion. This Note studies the relative merits of the two approaches 
courts have taken toward interpreting "willfulness" under the FLSA. 
It evaluates them by reference to the history of the limitations provi-
sion, concluding that the restrictive approach is more consonant with 
Congress's purpose in establishing a two-tiered statute of limitations. 
The classic expression of the broad interpretation came in Cole-
man v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc. s In that case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
a district court's holding that, in signing a collective bargaining 
agreement exempting it from paying the FLSA overtime rate, Jiffy 
June had willfully violated the FLSA even though the company had 
I. 29 u.s.c. § 255 (1976). 
2. The Act provides: 
Any action . . . to enforce any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid 
overtime compensation, or liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ... 
(a) ... may be co=enced within twi> years after the cause of action accrued, and 
every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the 
cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may 
be co=enced within three years after the cause of action accrued. 
29 u.s.c. § 255 (1976). 
3. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d I 139, 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
948 (1972). 
4. Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390, 392-93 (N.D. Fla. 1970). 
5. 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). The Department of Labor 
and employees of Jiffy June Farms sued under the FLSA for overtime pay allegedly due the 
employees. Before August, 1966, Jiffy June had properly paid the employees' overtime com• 
pensation. The Company then agreed to a collective bargaining agreement purportedly ex• 
empting it from paying the FLSA overtime rate. 458 F.2d at I 139. 
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acted reasonably and in good faith.6 The appellate court stated: 
The entire legislative history of the 1966 amendments of the FLSA 
indicates a liberalizing intention on the part of Congress. Requiring 
employers to have more than awareness of the possible applicability of 
the FLSA would be inconsistent with that intent. Consequently, we 
hold that employer's decision to change his employee's rate of pay in 
violation ofFLSA is ''willful" when, as in this case, there is substantial 
evidence in the record to support a finding that the employer knew or 
suspected that his actions might violate the FLSA. Stated most simply 
we think the test should be: Did the employer know the FLSA was in 
the picture?7 
Jtffy June has received widespread acceptance. The First and 
Fourth Circuits,8 and district courts in the Second, Third, Sixth, and 
Eighth Circuits,9 have all endorsed the broad test. And within the 
6. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 664, 670-71 (S.D. Ala. 1970). 
7. 458 F.2d at 1142. 
8. For First Circuit cases applying J[//y June, see Dunlop v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, 
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 416, 423-24 (D.N.H. 1976) (holding that the defendant's awareness of the 
Act subjected him to the three-year limitations period), revd on other grounds sub nom. Mar-
shall v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., 562 F.2d 1323 (1st Cir. 1977); Dunlop v. Rhode 
Island, 398 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.R.I. 1975) (holding that an earlier action against the de-
fendant brought under the FLSA by other employees demonstrated that the defendant was 
aware of the possible applicability of the FLSA). For Fourth Circuit decisions applying the 
JtlfyJune test, see Marshall v. Elks Club, 444 F. Supp. 957,968 (S.D. W. Va. 1977); Brennan v. 
Air Terminal Parking, 72 Lab. Cas. 46,205, 46,213 (D.S.C. 1973) (holding that the employer's 
assertion of an exemption under the Act established that the employer knew that the "FLSA 
was in the picture"), ajfd, 498 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir. 1974). 
9. Fordecisions in the Second and Third.Circuits applying theJ[//yJune test, see Marshall 
v. Sam Dell's Dodge Corp., 451 F. Supp. 294, 305 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that defendant 
knew that the "Act was in the picture" because of two earlier investigations by the Labor 
Department into the defendant's employment practices); Bailey v. Pilots' Assn. for Bay & 
River Delaware, 406 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that the defendant knew 
that the "Act was in the picture" because certain employees had previously asked about the 
minimum wage and the defendant had discussed the matter with counsel). 
Courts in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits are divided between broad and narrow readings of 
willfulness. For decisions in the Sixth Circuit applying J[//y June, see Usery v. Godwin Hard-
ware, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 1243, 1267 (W.D. Mich. 1976) (the court stated that the violations 
''were committed by the defendants knowingly . . . and were committed with at least a general 
awareness that the requirements of the law were in the picture; and nothing more is required to 
establish that violations were willful"); Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co., 407 F. 
Supp. 1090, 1094 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (concluding that "[A]n employer acts willfully ... if he 
knows or has reason to know that his conduct is governed by the Act. Neither a good faith 
belief in the lawfulness of his wage and overtime regulations nor ignorance of their invalidity 
shields the employer from the additional year of liability"), remanded on other grounds, 565 
F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 871 
(E.D. Tenn. 1973), ajfd, 509 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1975). For decisions in the Sixth Circuit not 
applying the J[//y June standard, see Marshall v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. I 166, 1194 
(N.D. Ohio 1979) (the court referred to both standards and held that the defendant's violation 
was willful even under a restrictive interpretation of the word); Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 
473 F. Supp. 465, 480-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (citing both tests and holding that the defendant's 
violations were willful even under the minority rule); Pezzillo v. General Tel. & Elec. Info. 
Sys., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1257, 1269 (M.D. Tenn. 1976) (citing both standards without distin-
guishing between them or adopting either), ajfd, 572 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1978); Hodgson v. 
Barge, Waggoner & Sumner, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 842, 845 (M.D. Tenn. 1972) (holding that the 
violation was not willful even though the Labor Department had conducted previous investi-
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Fifth Circuit, its application has grown even more expansive. A dis-
trict court in Florida, for example, applied the three-year limitation 
to an employer who "had reason to know the Act was in the picture', 
because he had dealt with lawyers and accountants in his business. 10 
The Fifth Circuit itself held that a defendant's violation was willful 
because he "had 'heard talk' that recent amendments had extended 
coverage to those in the position of his employees.,, 11 Indeed, in 
Hodgson v. Heard, 12 a district court in Georgia concluded that Jiffy 
June "subjects all but the most ignorant unsophisticated business-
man to the three-year statute."13 
Not all courts, however, have accepted this broad reading of the 
FLSA. Four district courts in the Tenth Circuit and one district 
court in the Seventh Circuit have approached willfulness more re-
strictively, 14 arguing that 
gations of the defendant's records), '!,(fd., 477 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1973). For decisions in the 
Eighth Circuit applying the Jilfy June test, see Herman v. Roosevelt Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 
432 F. Supp. 843, 851 (E.D. Mo. 1977), '!,(fd., 569 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1978); Brennan v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 410 F. Supp. 84, 102 (N.D. Iowa 1976) (holding that "the company was 
acutely aware of [the FLSA's] provisions. Accordingly, ... the Court holds that the three-
year limitations period for willful violations shall govern ... "). For decisions in the Eighth 
Circuit applying the minority standard, see Usery v. Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 35, 45 n.5 (D.N.D. 
1977) (''To hold that knowledge on the part of Defendant that the Fair Labor Standards Act 
governed its conduct ... necessarily means Defendant acted 'willfully' in violating the Equal 
Pay Act would be harsh, and would seem to go beyond what Congress had in mind when it 
added the 'willful' provisions ... ") (emphasis in original). 
10. Marshall v. Suicide Prevention, 82 Lab. Cas. 47,960, 47,966-67 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
11. Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d I, 3 (5th Cir. 1974). 
12. 69 Lab. Cas. 45,598, 45,600 (N.D. Ga. 1972). 
13. 69 Lab. Cas. at 45,600. For additional Fifth Circuit cases applying the Jilfy June test, 
see Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443, 
448-49 (5th Cir.) (holding that central office memoranda advising district managers of the 
implementation of the Equal Pay Act amendment to the FLSA established that the defendant 
knew that "the FLSA was in the picture"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); Brennan v. Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp., 482 F.2d 825, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that previous 
investigations by the Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department indicated that the 
employer knew that "the FLSA was in the picture"); Marshall v. A & M Consol. Indep. School 
Dist., 81 Lab. Cas. 47,869, 47,873 (S.D. Tex. 1977), (holding that "for a violation to be willful it 
is not necessary that the employer know that his actions were contrary to the requirements of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act"), '!,(fd., 605 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Suicide Pre-
vention, 82 Lab. Cas. 47,960 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Hodgson v. Eunice Superette, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 
639,644 (W.D. La. 1973); Clark v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 886,897 n.17 (N.D. 
Ga. 1973) (testimony by the defendant's sports editor that he suspected that the plaintiff was 
preparing a case to take before the Wage and Hour Division established that defendant knew 
that "the FLSA was in the picture"); Hodgson v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 
741, 747 (M.D. Fla. 1972) ("(d]efendants' 'history' of investigations under and violations of the 
Act" demonstrated that they knew "the Act was in the picture"), modffeed 011 other grounds, 482 
F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1973). 
14. For Tenth Circuit cases applying this interpretation, see Marshall v. McAlester Corp., 
438 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (E.D. Okla. 1977); Hodgson v. Unified School Dist., 21 Wage and 
Hour Cas. 574, 577 (D. Kan. 1973); Hodgson v. Perkins, 63 Lab. Cas. 44,393, 44,394 (D.N.M. 
1970); Wirtz v. Greenhaw Supermarket, Inc., 59 Lab. Cas. 43,668, 43,669 (W.D. Okla. 1968). 
But see Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936, 949 (D. Colo. 1979) 
(citing the J!!Jj, June test as the applicable standard). The Ninth Circuit has not yet adopted a 
particular test for willfulness. In Hodgson v. Cactus Craft, 481 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1973), 
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[t]he word "willful" ... as used in the ... Act retains its traditional 
meaning that violations of the Act must be deliberate, voluntary and 
intentional. . . . One is not willful if he merely has knowledge of the 
provisions of the Act. There must be action taken on the basis of that 
knowledge which intentionally violates the Act. 15• 
Under this test, the court asks not whether the employer knew 
that the FLSA was "in the picture," but whether the employer real-
ized that he was violating the FLSA or whether the employer's con-
duct was "marked by careless disregard" of the FLSA. 16 Simple 
negligence is not enough to constitute willfulness. 17 Indeed, an em-
ployer's good faith vet non often determines which limitation should 
apply. 18 Courts using this approach also consider whether the em-
ployer had to resolve complex legal issues to determine the lawful-
ness of his employment practices. 19 They are thus reluctant to 
impose a three-year limitation unless the employer actually knew he 
was violating the Act. 
Although Congress never explicitly stated the purpose of the will-
fulness provision, the history of the 1966 Amendments - which cre-
ated the two-tiered limitations structure - gives several clues to the 
federal policies at stake. The first FLSA statute of limitations was a 
congressional response to a line of cases in the 1940s, in which the 
Supreme Court had found that workers in certain industries were 
entitled under the FLSA to more compensation than they had re-
the court held that the defendant had willfully violated the FLSA in view of three previous 
Labor Department investigations of the defendant's employment practices and the defendant's 
unkept promises of future compliance. The court did not, however, advance a willfulness test 
nor did it cite any case law support. In Marshall v. Hills Bros., 432 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (N.D. 
Cal. 1977), the court did "not reach the question of exactly what conduct constitutes a willful 
violation ... because the issue [was] not appropriate for summary judgment." 
The District of Columbia Circuit has proposed a third test. In Laffey v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), the court held that 
an employer's violation is willful "when he is cognizant of an appreciable possibility that he 
may be subject to the statutory requirements and fails to take steps reasonably calculated to 
resolve the doubt." The court noted that "the same conclusion follows when an equally aware 
employer consciously and voluntarily charts a course which turns out to be wrong." The court 
then reasoned that "in situations of that sort, 'the act [is] deliberate, voluntary and intentional 
as distinguished from one committed through inadvertence, accidentally or by ordinary negli-
gence.' " However, only one subsequent case has applied this standard. Nitterright v. Claytor, 
454 F. Supp. 130, 139 (D.D.C. 1978). 
For a district court decision in the Seventh Circuit applying the minority rule, see 
Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F. Supp. 257, 264 (E.D. Wis. 1970). 
15. Brennan v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 871, 876 (E.D. Tenn. 
1973), qffd., 509 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1975). 
16. Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390,393 (N.D. Fla. 1970). See Hodgson v. Perkins, 63 
Lab. Cas. 44,393, 44,394 (D.N.M. 1970). 
17. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Greenhaw Supermarket, Inc., 59 Lab. Cas. 43,668, 43,670 (W.D. 
Okla. 1968). 
18. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Unified School Dist., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 574,577 (D. Kan. 
1973). 
19. See Marshall v. McAlester Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (E.D. Okla. 1977). 
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ceived.20 Hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of claims were filed 
under the FLSA after these decisions.21 In response to these claims, 
Congress declared in the Portal to Portal Act of 1947 that the courts 
had wrongly interpreted the FLSA to impose "unexpected liabilities, 
immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon employers."22 
In addition, Congress found "that the varying and extended periods 
of time for which, under the laws of the several States, potential ret-
roactive liability may be imposed upon employers, have given and 
will give rise to great difficulties in the sound and orderly conduct of 
business and industry."23 Congress therefore established a two-year 
statute of limitations for all claims under the FLSA,24 declaring that 
this would eliminate the "lack of uniformity throughout the Na-
tion."25 
In 1965, the administration introduced a bill that would have ex-
tended the limitation period to three years.26 Secretary of Labor 
Wirtz testified before the House Subcommittee on Labor that the 
purpose of the proposed change was to "allow workers more time to 
familiarize themselves with their legal right to back wages."27 The 
Committee, however, reacted by proposing - without explanatory 
comment28 - the present two-tiered limitation scheme.29 
It seems clear that, by creating the willfulness requirement in this 
context, Congress sought a fair balance between Secretary Wirtz's 
concerns and a desire not to unduly burden small businesses that 
were honestly trying to comply with the FLSA. Other provisions in 
the 1966 Amendments extended the reach of the FLSA, largely by 
20. In Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590 (1944), the Supreme Court held 
that underground iron ore miners were entitled under the FLSA to be paid for time spent 
traveling between the portal or entrance of the mine and the working area. The miners had 
previously been compensated for only the time they spent at the working area. The Supreme 
Court later extended its holding to cover bituminous coal miners and pottery plant employees. 
See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 (1945); 
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). 
21. An estimated 395,223 employees filed suit under the FLSA, claiming a total of 
$775,705,800. See H.R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in (1947] U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1029, 1031. 
22. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § l, 29 U.S.C. § 25l(a) (1976). 
23. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § l, 29 U.S.C. § 25l(a) (1976). 
24. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, § 6, 61 Stat. 87-88 (1947) (current version at 29 
u.s.c. § 255 (1976)). 
25. H.R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in (1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 1029, 1035. 
26. H.R. 8259, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Minimum Wage-Hour Amendments: Hear-
ings on R.R. 8259 Before the General Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
4 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on R.R. 8259]. 
27. Id at 11. 
28. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
29. See H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1966); S. REP. No. 1487, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 64, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3002, 3037. 
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lowering the minimum gross sales requirement for employers from 
$1,000,000 to $500,000 in 1967 and to $250,000 in 1969.3° Census 
reports showed that, in the retail business alone, at least 62,100 com-
panies then had gross sales between $250,000 and $1,000,000.31 
Congress was concerned that these small businesses would have dif-
ficulty complying "with the restrictions . . . in some 300 pages of 
rules, regulations and interpretations" accompanying the FLSA. 32 
Subcommittee testimony forged the link between those concerns and 
the proposed three-year limitation period. Representatives of the 
National Retail Merchants Association testified that "[t]he addition 
of a year to the statute of limitations would merely serve to increase 
the period during which employers are subject to harassment with 
respect to technical violations."33 And members of the American 
Bankers Association declared: 
[F]rom the employer's side the change would make a difference of a 
SO-percent increase in his unknown liabilities, and for small businesses 
that is a big difference. Extending the statute of limitation would im-
pose an unnecessary potential burden on thousands of small conc~ms 
that are honestly trying to live up to the laws and regulations, but be-
cause of the variety of possible interpretations have, in good faith, ar-
rived at a conclusion different than one subsequently arrived at by the 
Wage-Hour inspector.34 
Moreover, House members heard testimony that many FLSA vi-
olations are inadvertent: "[I]t is not uncommon for an employer to 
find that actions, which he sincerely believed were in full compliance 
with the mandate of the act, have become violations . . . ."35 As 
Judge Spottswood Robinson of the D.C. Circuit later opined, "There 
is ample room . . . for an informed belief that, with the amend-
ments' broad expansion of the Act's coverage and resultant concern 
over the effect on the small businessman, an unqualified increase of 
the limitation period would bear too heavily upon an inevitably 
larger group of excusably inadvertent violators."36 
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1976). 
31. See S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (statement of Senator Fannin) re-
printed in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3044. 
32. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (statement of Senator Fannin), reprinted in 
[1966] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3043. See Hearings on R.R. 8259, supra note 26, 533-34 
(statement of Lawrence Leyton, National Retail Merchants Association). 
33. Hearings on R.R. 8259, supra note 26, at 534 (statement of Lawrence Leyton, National 
Retail Merchants Association). 
34. Id at 2250 (statement of the American Bankers Association). 
35. Id at 2241-42 (statement of the American Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages). 
36. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,460 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1086 (1978) (footnotes omitted). See Hearings on R.R. 8259, supra note 26, at 54 (Repre~ 
sentative Martin questioning Secretary of Labor Wirtz): 
Mr. Martin. [Y]ou have extended the 2-year statute of limitations to 3 years. Now, isn't it 
true that most of the violations that you have run into have not been deliberate violations 
of the law? 
Sec. Wirtz. That is correct. 
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The language of the new limitations provision reflects these con-
cerns. Its linguistic structure suggests that the three-year limitations 
period was intended to be the exception and not the rule: 
Any action . . . may be commenced within two years after the cause of 
action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless 
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except 
that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be com-
menced within three years after the cause of action accrued.37 
The J!lfy June standard, however, turns that suggestion on its head. 
Indeed, of the twenty-five cases to apply the J!lfy June test, only one 
found an employer's violation to be nonwillful.38 The Fifth Circuit 
seems to have designed the test so as to effectively eliminate the two-
year limitation from the FLSA,39 thus decreasing the incentive for 
employers to make honest efforts at compliance with the Act. 
Consider the facts of two key Fifth Circuit opinions. In J!lfy 
June, the defendant contended that his violation was not willful be-
cause he had asked his lawyer whether the proposed agreement 
would violate the FLSA and was told that it would not.40 The court 
rejected this argument, concluding that allowance of such a defense 
would permit employers to avoid the three-year limitations period 
too easily.41 Indeed, the court noted that the defendant's consulta-
tion with his lawyer indicated that he knew "that the FLSA had to 
Mr. Martin. Why make a change here from 2 to 3 years on your statute of limitations? 
You haven't any difficulty so far; have you? 
Sec. Wirtz. There is difficulty .... There will come to my attention frequently situations 
in which there has been a violation, and cases in which there will not be repayment volun-
tarily, and in which the repayment is barred because of the 2-year statute of limitations. 
That does seem unfair. 
Mr. Martin. You have run into that situation quite frequently, have you, or is it just 
isolated cases? 
Sec. Wirtz. You are right in suggesting that in most cases there will be inadvertence as far 
as the violation is concerned, and also voluntary repayment, but there remain a substan-
tial number of cases in which whether as a result of inadvertence or intention, the em-
ployer will have violated the law, and in which he will not voluntarily go back beyond the 
2 years. On every one of those cases, this problem would arise, and that is a substantial 
number. 
I think we could give you some statistical suggestion of that from our records. It is not 
a matter of small consequence, but rather, of large consequence, and the 3-year rule, as 
you know, is a kind of general average among the States for statutes of limitations on 
matters of this sort, so this would bring it in line with the general statute of limitations in 
civil and related matters. 
Mr. Martin. I was hoping we could be a little different in this legislation. 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976) (emphasis added). 
38. See Marshall v. Debord, 84 Lab. Cas. 48,471, at 48,479 (E.D. Okla. 1978) (the defen-
dant operated an institution for the sick, the aged, and the mentally ill or defective. The court 
found that the defendant was not aware that he was subject to the provisions of the Act). 
39. Only the most unsophisticated employer would not suspect that his employment prac-
tices might be governed by the FLSA. See, e.g., Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co., 
407 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 (W.D. Ky. 1975), remanded on other grounds, 565 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 
1977). 
40. 458 F.2d at l14l. 
41. 458 F.2d at I 141-42. 
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be considered," and thus supported the conclusion that his violation 
was willful.42 In Brennan v. Heard,43 on the other hand, the court 
found an employer's violation willful because he had "heard talk" 
that the FLSA covered his employees, even though he had not 
sought professional advice on the matter. The court held: "Defen-
dant's unwillingness to make further inquiries and to determine the 
exact parameters of his statutory obligation affords him no protec-
tion. An ostrichlike cultivation of ignorance has never been consid-
ered a defense to liability for willful violation of the Act."44 Thus, 
under this test, an employer who suspects that his employees may be 
covered by the FLSA is in a no-win position. If he seeks profes-
sional advice, he reveals that he knew "the FLSA was in the pic-
ture."45 But if he does not seek professional advice, his "ostrichlike 
behavior" can only be evidence of bad faith-indirect proof that his 
original violation was willful.46 
A more restrictive interpretation of willfulness frees the employer 
from this dilemma. For example, the Tenth Circuit's test (requiring 
intent to violate the FLSA) punishes only the evil or reckless em-
ployer. Mere awareness of the Act's existence does not make a viola-
tion willful; the employer must either act on the basis of that 
knowledge to intentionally violate the FLSA 47 or act in "careless dis-
regard" of its provisions.48 An employer would thus have an incen-
tive to determine his statutory obligations, so that he could later 
demonstrate his "honest belief that [he] was not within the scope of 
the Act."49 Indeed, an employer's failure to investigate his status 
would be evidence of "careless disregard" of the FLSA tending to 
support a finding of willfulness. so 
Such an approach has the additional advantage of giving mean-
ing to the bifurcated limitations laid down by Congress. It does not 
effectively eliminate the two-year statute of limitations; in nine of the 
fourteen cases applying this test, courts have found FLSA violations 
to be nonwillful.51 This conforms with the statutory suggestion that 
42. 458 F.2d at 1142. 
43. 491 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1974)-
44. 491 F.2d at 3. 
45. See, e.g., Marshall v. Sam Dell's Dodge Corp., 451 F. Supp. 294, 304-05 (N.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
46. See, e.g., Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465, 480-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1979). 
47. See, e.g., Brennan v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 871, 876 
(E.D. Tenn. 1973). 
48. Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390, 392-93 (N.D. Fla. 1970). 
49. Hodgson v. Unified School Dist., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 574, 577 (D. Kan. 1973). 
50. See, e.g., Dowd v. Blackstone Cleaners, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (N.D. Tex. 1969). 
51. For cases holding violations nonwillful, see Usery v. Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 35, 45 
(D.N.D. 1977); Marshall v. McAlester Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1005, IOI I (E.D. Okla. 1977); 
Bishop'v. Jellelf Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 593 (D.D.C. 1975); Hodgson v. Unified School 
Dist., 21 Wage and Ho~r Cas. 574,577 (D. Kan. 1973); Hodgson v. Barge, Waggoner & Sum-
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the three-year statute of limitations should be the exception and not 
the rule.52 Most important, application of the minority standard is 
consistent with Congress's intent to protect excusably inadvertent vi-
olators from the more burdensome three-year statute.53 In each of 
the nine cases holding that the employer's violation was nonwillful, 
the court found that the employer had honestly tried to comply with 
the FLSA.54 Yet in each of these cases, a court applying the Jiffy 
June test would have found these inadvertent violations to be will-
ful, since the employers had realized that "the FLSA was in the pic-
ture." Finally, the Tenth Circuit's approach also conforms with 
judicial interpretations of the term "willful," as used in other civil 
statutes. Generally willful means intentional.55 As the Supreme 
Court has said, willful "often denotes that which is 'intentional, or 
knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental,' and . . . is 
employed to characterize 'conduct marked by careless disregard 
whether or not one has the right so to act.' "56 Even the Fifth Circuit 
has endorsed such an interpretation, holding that willful, as used in 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, means "voluntary 
action, done either with an intentional disregard of, or plain indiff er-
ence to, the requirements of the statute."5_7 Nothing in the language 
ner, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 842, 845 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); Hill v. Moss-American, Inc., 63 Lab. Cas. 
44,360 at 44,361; Hodgson v. Perkins, 63 Lab. Cas. 44,393, 44,394 (D.N.M. 1970); Wirtz v. 
Greenhaw Supermarket, Inc., 59 Lab. Cas. 43,668, 43,669 (W.D. Okla. 1968). 
For cases holding violations willful, see Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465, 
480-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Marshall v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1194 (N.D. 
Ohio 1979); Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F. Supp. 257,264 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Hodg-
son v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390,393 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Dowd v. Blackstone Cleaners, Inc., 306 F. 
Supp. 1276, 1281 (N.D. Tex. 1969). 
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976). 
53. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,460 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. de11ied, 434 
U.S. 1086 (1978). 
54. See note 51 supra. 
55. For decisions holding that willful means intentional in other federal statutes not defin-
ing willful, see, e.g., Western Waterproofing Co. v. Marshall, 476 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir.) 
(holding that a willful violation of OSHA requires a " 'knowing, conscious, and deliberate 
flaunting of the Act'"), cert. de11ied, 439 U.S. 965 (1978); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. 
Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (holding that under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), which prescribes liquidated damages for willful vio-
lations, willful refers to "conduct that is intentional, knowing and voluntary, as distinguished 
from conduct that is accidental or unknowing"); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engr. Co., 404 
F. Supp. 324, 334 (D.N.J. 1975) (the word willful in the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act "must be construed in the civil sense. It therefore applies to violations which are inten-
tional, knowing or voluntary as distinguished from accidental ... "), cert. de11ied, 434 U.S. 
1022 (1978); Guthrie v. 1Jnited States, 316 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (holding that 
willful, as used in I.R.C. § 6672, prescribing civil penalties for willful violations, "refers to 
'voluntary, conscious and intentional' "); Datlof v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 11, 33 (E.D. 
Pa.) (holding that under the Internal Revenue Code "in civit cases •.. the word 'willful' 
means intentional, knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental"), affd, 370 F.2d 
655 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 906 (1967). 
56. United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 243 (1938). 
57. Georgia Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309,319 (5th Cir. 1979). The court did note, 
however, that the meaning of willful may vary with the context in which it is used. 
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'of the FLSA or its history suggests that Congress intended to use this 
standard term in a new or special way. 
Any statute of limitations that depends upon willfulness presents 
problems of interpretation. Yet these difficulties should not drive 
courts to twist the word's meaning or to ignore expressions of intent. 
The Jiffy June standard of willfulness not only ignores congressional 
intent, but also unnecessarily burdens those employers who sincerely 
try to comply with the FLSA. It effectively rewrites the statute-of-
limitations provision by making the three-year period the rule and 
the two-year period the exception. If such an interpretation were 
essential to fulfill the goals of the FLSA, it might be defensible. Yet, 
as we have seen, the Tenth Circuit's standard seems more likely to 
promote compliance with the Act since it rewards good faith. It is 
both fairer and more effective. The Fifth Circuit and the other 
courts following Jiffy June should reconsider their positions. 
